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SOCIAL CRITICISM AND LEGAL
PHILOSOPHY: SOME REFLECTIONS ON LAW
AND THE NEW POLITICS
CoRNELius F. MuRPHY, JR.*
INTRODUCTION

Sociological insights have proven that positive law is not a completely autonomous discipline. Legal rules have a symbolic, as well as
a jural, significance; statutes and decisions point beyond themselves to
an underlying social conflict of which they are the product. The "law"
is, in large measure, the response of a legislator, administrative official,
or judge, to demands being made by various participants, seeking
through different strategies to realize preferred values.
Like positive law, legal philosophy suffers challenges to its independence. Theories about law cannot be developed in isolation from
other truths about the nature of reality. A good deal of legal philosophy
reflects this interdependence, e.g., historical jurisprudence, cultural
jurisprudence, sociological jurisprudence, as well as legal theories which
purport to constitute a strict analysis of the positive law.
Most of these relationships have been happy marriages; the alien
discipline often merges with the jural phenomena to form a more comprehensive legal philosophy. But there are also some theories of knowledge which stand over against legal theory, professing insights by which
the jural realm must be evaluated, and refusing to be incorporated into
the fabric of legal philosophy. Much of the interaction between natural
law and positive law has been of such an antithetical character. In contemporary thought, a comparable tension is developing between legal
philosophy and modem social theory.
Thinkers such as Herbert Marcusel and Michael Harrington 2 have
*Professor of Law, Duquesne University. B.S., College of the Holy Cross, 1954; LL.B.,
Boston College, 1957; LL.M., University of Virginia, 1962.
1 In this study attention is primarily devoted to the work of Professor Marcuse, the

most influential and provocative thinker in the field of social criticism. His most well-

known work is ONE-DIMENSIONAL MAN (1964) [hereinafter ONE-DIMENSIONAL MAN], a compelling study of the way in which modem industrial capitalism frustrates the aspirations
of the human person towards autonomy and fulfillment. His more recent book, AN ESSAy
ON I1BERATION (1969) [hereinafter LIBERION], continues the ideas of One-Dimensional
Man and contains some valuable insights into the motives of student rebellion. For a
more complex understanding of Marcuse's thought, his earlier writings should be consulted. Marcuse insists upon rationality in social existence, a compulsion traceable to his
interest in Hegel and expressed in REASON AND REVOLUTION (3d ed. 1955). Freudian concepts are examined in ERos AND CrVILIZATION (1955) and play a major role in his continuing analysis of repression. (Marcuse's thought also reveals the impact of Schopenhauer,

39

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[VoL. 45:39

developed theories of social criticism by which they seek to measure the
actual organization of social life in terms of deeper tendencies immanent within society. Disavowing, in the main, any transcendental authority, the new movement judges existing institutions in terms of the
possibilities of human development which are immanent to the social
group and can be empirically identified. These forces for humanistic
improvement, manifest by discontent and bewilderment, find their
aspirations nullified by the status quo. Much of the new theory is devoted to a critique of present social, political, and economic institutions,
pointing out why they frustrate more sublime aspirations towards human freedom.
In their books, these thinkers have conducted their evaluations
and appraisals forcefully, demonstrating the diverse ways in which
modem industrial societies - of both democratic and socialist persuasion- suffocate enormous amounts of human potential. The impulses
which drive us to unending production - especially of armaments and
gadgets - have their roots in a complex social organization which, while
promising peace and prosperity, actually succeeds in threatening and
deforming the very persons it would protect. Thus, Professor Marcuse
observes:
If we attempt to relate the causes of the danger to the way in
which society is organized and organizes its members, we are immediately confronted with the fact that advanced industrial society
becomes richer, bigger, and better as it perpetuates the danger.
The defense structure makes life easier for a greater number of
people and extends man's mastery of nature. Under these circumstances, our mass media have little difficulty in selling particular
interests as those of all sensible men. The political needs of society
become individual needs and aspirations, their satisfaction promotes business and the commonwealth, and the whole appears to
be the very embodiment of Reason.
And yet this society is irrational as a whole. Its productivity is
destructive of the free development of human needs and faculties,
its peace maintained by the constant threat of war, its growth dependent on the repression of the real possibilities for pacifying the
struggle for existence -individual, national and international.
This repression, so different from that which characterized the
preceding, less developed stages of our society, operates today not
from a position of natural and technical immaturity but rather
particularly in an appraisal of the aesthetic impulses behind the new movement. See
LIBERATION ch. 5.) For a general bibliography of Marcuse's writings, see THE CRITICL
SPIRIT, ESSAYS IN HONOR OF HERBERT MARCUSE, pt. 4 (K. Wolff & B. Moore eds. 1967).
2 Harrington's works include: TOWARD A DEMOCRATIC LFT (1968); THE ACCIDENTAL
CENTURY (1967); TR OTHER AMmUcA (1964). For a general discussion of the New Left
Movement, see C. LAscH, THE AGONY OF THE AmERICAN LEFT (1969).
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from a position of strength. The capabilities (intellectual and material) of contemporary society are immeasurably greater than ever
before - which means that the scope of society's domination over
the individual is immeasurably greater than ever before. Our
society distinguishes itself by conquering the centrifugal social
forces with Technology rather than Terror, on the dual basis of an
overwhelming efficiency and an increasing standard of living.3
Little can be added to this general indictment. While it cannot be

accepted without qualification, most would admit that Marcuse's critique contains a great deal of genuine insight and that it is expressive
of truths about the human condition which law and legal theory cannot
ignore. On those premises, it remains to be seen how legal philosophy
falls within its terms. We must try to understand how an apparently
neutral jurisprudence may be an accomplice to the inhuman way of life
which the new criticism has so dramatically condemned. Toward this
end, we shall try to identify some of the ways in which legal philosophy
is subordinate to social theory, and also suggest new directions for jurisprudence- fresh departures for a creative response to a devastating
social appraisal of our way of life. In the first instance, we should understand what modem thought considers to be the nature of law.
Recent juristic reflections, both here and in Great Britain, have
made possible the development of a comprehensive definition of law.
The modem analytic school of jurisprudence 4 has successfully challenged the traditional idea, inherited from Hobbes and Austin, that law
is essentially the command of a sovereign political authority to its
subjects; an order coupled with the threat of sanction in case of disobedience. Modernists have demonstrated that such a conception fails to
account for important phenomena which we normally think of as
having a legal quality. For example, it is only with difficulty that the
passage by Congress of a statute outlawing certain forms of interstate
travel can be fit into the Austinian definition. The problem is not only
one of identifying the sovereign to whom they are responding, but it is
also one of characterizing the discretionary decision of the legislators as
a form of obedience to a command. Similarly, in the private sphere, the
making of a will is usually understood as being a legal transaction, yet
its drafting can hardly be characterized as a reaction to a threat of harm.
The reason why traditional definitions cannot encompass all jural
3 ONE-DIMENSIONAL MAN iX.

4 The modern analytic school includes thinkers such as H. L. A. Hart, Glanville
Williams and Graham Hughes from Great Britain; Ronald M. Dworkin and Herbert
Morris in the United States. For a bibliography, see Summers, The New Analytical Jurists, 41 N.Y.U.L. REv. 861 (1966). In the present essay, reliance is placed upon the work
of Hart, especially his THE CONCE r or LAW (1965).
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phenomena is that such definitions stress only the external aspect of law.
Law is, in many respects, a sanctioning process, but that is only part of
the story. For a fuller comprehension, one must move from the outside,
inward, perceiving attitudes toward law held by the society itself. Analysis should begin with the social group rather than with a projected
Leviathan. The way in which officials, lawyers, and private persons view
their behavior is as important a consideration as is the viewpoint of a
fictitious sovereign.
With Hart, this shift from an external to an internal perspective is
accomplished through an anthropological approach to legal definition.
In order to understand law, the evolution of its meaning must be examined in human consciousness. In the evolution from primitive organization to the establishment of mature legal orders certain intelligible
features emerge. A primitive society operates with certain basic rules,
mostly prohibitory in character. They provide security, but have limitations which a developing society will seek to overcome. The rules are
not systematized, and when doubts arise about their meaning, there is
no orderly way to overcome the uncertainty. Rudimentary norms are
also static: the members of the community have fixed rights and duties,
and there is no way of modifying the rules in order to meet the needs
of changing circumstances. Finally, the regime is inefficient. Social pressures are the principal means of assuring conformity with prevailing
standards; in case of violation, it is difficult to apprehend and punish
offenders.
The remedies which evolving societies create to overcome such
deficiencies are threefold. The problem of uncertainty is met by the
introduction of rules of recognition. Some datum, e.g., a stone tablet,
a religious document, a human figure, an institution, is considered as
an authoritative way of eliminating doubt. If the suggested rule is validated by that authoritative symbol, it can be taken to be the rule
of the group. To overcome the immobile quality of primitive norms,
rules of change are introduced. Society empowers individuals to introduce new primary rules for the life of the group. These may be
either public or private powers. The passage of legislation illustrates the
exercise of a public power; the execution of a will exemplifies private
authority. To overcome the final deficiency - inefficiency - the maturing group develops rules of adjudication, conferring upon individuals
the power to determine if a primary rule has been broken, and to provide appropriate remedies.
Combining these insights, we see that law cannot be comprehended
in terms of the simple model of commands and sanctions. Viewed interi-
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orly, as it has evolved in social consciousness, law is understood as a
much more complex phenomena. The external, obligatory dimension
remains, but it is joined with facilities by which public officials and
private citizens identify, modify, and apply the legal rules. In a modem,
comprehensive definition, law is a union of primary rules of obligation
and secondary rules of recognition, change and adjudication.
Within this contemporary definition, that aspect dealing with secondary rules of change is of particular interest to the average American
lawyer. This form of secondary rules is important insofar as it validates
the exercise of private powers to achieve desirable results. It is important because it accentuates the jural quality of the professional work in
which he is most often engaged. The majority of attorneys make their
living in the realm of private lawmaking, drafting deeds and contracts,
corporate charters and by-laws - the immense range of documentary
expertise by which he helps private persons and corporations realize
their personal and social ambitions.
Psychologically, it is important that the lawyer view this work as
authentic legal enterprise, and not as marginal activity which suffers by
comparison with the "real" legal work such as litigation. Once assured
that the private sector of social change is an essential part of law, the
practitioner's sense of self-esteem is enhanced. He can now see that
[i]n carrying out his work as law-maker, the lawyer is at once the
architect and the builder of legal relationships. He draws on his
legal learning for knowledge of the legal tools and materials he can
use and their capacity to bear loads and to withstand stresses. At
the same time, he draws on his knowledge of human nature and
business practice to gauge the workability of the arrangements he
is considering. In addition, he employs his skill in analyzing problems and in using language effectively to make sure that the documents embodying the arrangements he has designed cover all
significant contingencies .. .
Concentration of professional energy upon the sphere of private
lawmaking has undoubtedly been productive of much individual and
social good. Our ability to facilitate transfers of property, negotiate
commercial agreements, and create corporate documents has improved the life-prospects of countless individuals. Moreover, these
talents have not been expended exclusively upon the rich. A lawyer's
ability to draft charters and contracts is of as much value to labor unions
as it is to corporations; indeed, innumerable individuals with small
business enterprises are similarly dependent upon these abilities. As the
5 Cavers, Legal Education and Lawyer Made Law, 54 W. VA. L. REv. 177, 180 (1951).
See also H. HART & A. SACKS, THE LEGAL PRocrss (10th ed. 1958).
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war on poverty continues, it is becoming evident that the poor are also
in need of legal services of a drafting, counseling and negotiating
character.
Yet given this positive good which flows from the lawyer's involvement with the means of private improvement, we must be willing to
appraise this commitment in the light of modern social criticism. The
material well-being of many is elevated as a result of our labors, but
should that be the supreme measure of professional achievement? Are
not the innumerable corporate charters, commercial documents, and tax
and finance plans, the instruments of a social structure which thinkers
like Marcuse would condemn? Are these areas of private lawmaking in
which we so proudly participate bound up with a stultifying ethos
which projects "particular interests as those of all sensible men"? Does
our extensive professional involvement with private business objectives
preclude us from serving the public good? These are the types of questions which the penetrating insights of social critics" force us to examine.
Considered reflection upon them could substantially alter the orientation of law and the commitments of the legal profession for the foreseeable future.
THE CONVERGENCE OF LAW AND SocIAL CRIICIsM

There is a sense in which the internal development of law reflects
the extralegal critiques of social theory. Consider, for example, contracts. Viewed positively, they are a model of private rules of change.
0 Criticism of the private law approach comes from varied sources. Tax law experts
could ponder the observations of former Senator Paul Douglas:
It used to be said by some that the trouble with democracy is that the ablest
and best educated men and women in the country do not take part in political
affairs, but that if they would only interest themselves more in public matters
they would set matters right.
But it has been the extremely able who have inserted these loopholes in the
tax laws. The loopholes and even more, the truckholes, are defended against
elimination or lessening by other extremely able men. The large hearing room
of the Finance Committee seats a hundred and fifty persons. When we considered a tax bill, the room was filled with prosperous lawyers, graduates of greater
universities and of the top ranking law schools, whom Assistant Secretary of the
Treasury Stanley Surrey once referred to in a burst of admiration as "the best
minds in the country," all working to hold what they and their clients had and
to enlarge it.
One major trouble with our tax system is, therefore, precisely this: that these
"best minds" in the country have largely worked to make it what it is. Not more
than one out of every hundred citizens actively working on a tax bill is trying to
represent the general interest. And in the halls outside the hearing rooms the
lobbyists are as thick as flies, while the publicity men and noisemakers are busily
at work in Washington and elsewhere. In the halls of Academe, erudite professors train their students in the intricacies of the tax code so that their students
may succeed in the private practice of law by helping wealthy clients avoid taxes
and thus beat the government of the people.
Douglas, The Problem of Tax Loopholes, 87 Am. SCHOLAR 21, 39-40 (1968).
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The agreement process is primarily a vehicle for the creation and
exchange of wealth, and the legal profession's contributions to its development have been of vast social significance. Yet, contract law is, in

large measure, a reflection not only of the economy, but also of a general
way of life which measures human well-being in terms of the production
and consumption of material goods. To the extent to which its proponents seek to identify the process with the achievement of happiness,
they are now being met with a strong dissent. From the perspective of
social criticism, the endless exchange of goods and services diminishes
man; the processes of commodity production are an exploitive device
which creates servitudes more damaging to the human spirit than any
previous forms of enslavement.
The so-called consumer economy and the politics of corporate
capitalism have created a second nature of man which ties him
libidinally and aggressively to the commodity form. The need for
possessing, consuming, handling, and constantly renewing the
gadgets, devices, instruments, engines, offered to and imposed upon
the people, for using these wares even at the danger of one's own
destruction, has become a 'biological' need.... The second nature
of man thus militates against any change that would disrupt and
perhaps even abolish this dependence of man on a market ever
more densely filled with merchandise- abolish his existence as a
consumer consuming himself in buying and selling. 7
These observations are as much a measure of legal theory as they
are a critique of the economy. Yet it is possible to discern within the
growth of the law a humanistic movement which has started to meet
the objections to the status quo raised by social criticism.
Individual justice is often a casualty in an affluent society. Where
an abundance of "things" is equated with happiness, it seems to be a
small loss that the moral dimensions of giving to each his due are obscured in the process of production and consumption. Such an assumption calls into question the integrity of the legal process. Fortunately,
law has been responsive to the challenge. The extension of implied
warranties of merchantability beyond the immediate parties and the
application of these protections to a broadening number of "goods and
services" demonstrate that the legal conscience has not entirely ignored the detrimental effects of mass production. And, by interposing
law against the exigencies of the market, courts have begun to manifest
an awareness of the oppressive power of corporate capitalism. For
7 LammnoN 11.
8 Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel, 69 YAmx L.J. 1099 (1960).
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example, in Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc.,9 the New Jersey
Supreme Court identified the dominating position of major corporations within the market economy and refuted the suggestion that agreements reached within this system were the result of a bargain struck
by equal and free participants:
The limitations of privity in contracts for the sale of goods developed their place in the law when marketing conditions were
simple, when maker and buyer frequently met face to face on an
equal bargaining plane and when many of the products were relatively uncomplicated and conducive to inspection by a buyer competent to evaluate their quality. . . . With the advent of mass
marketing, the manufacturer became remote from the purchaser,
sales were accomplished through intermediaries, and the demand for
the product was created by advertising media. In such an economy,
it became obvious that the consumer was the person being cultivated. Manifestly, the connotation of "consumer" was broader
than that of "buyer." He signified such a person who, in the reasonable contemplation of the parties to the sale, might be expected
to use the product. Thus, where the commodities sold are such
that if defectively manufactured they will be dangerous to life or
limb, then society's interests can only be protected by eliminating
the requirement of privity between the maker and his dealers and
the reasonably expected ultimate consumer....
Under modem conditions the ordinary layman, responding to
the importuning of colorful advertising, has neither the opportunity
nor the capacity to inspect or to determine the fitness of an automobile for use; he must rely on the manufacturer who has control of its
construction, and to some degree on the dealer who, to the limited
extent called for by the manufacturer's instructions, inspects and
services it before delivery. In such a marketing milieu his remedies
and those of persons who properly claim through him should not
depend "upon the intricacies of the law of sales. The obligation of
the manufacturer should not be based alone on privity of contract.
It should rest, as was once said, upon 'the demands of social justice.' "10
Consciousness of inequality has brought other changes to legal
doctrine. Viewed as an exercise of private powers, the agreement process
is an area of private lawmaking; the participants create for themselves
a regime of rights and duties which will facilitate the achievement of
their desired objectives. This lawmaking takes place within the bound9 32 NJ. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
10 Id. at 379, 384, 161 A.2d at 82, 83 (citation omitted). The implied warranty concept
has been used to remedy injustices in the housing field. See, e.g., Waggoner v. Midwestern
Dev., 154 N.W.2d 803 (S.D. 1967); Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, 44 N.J. 70, 207 A.2d 314 (1965).
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aries of primary rules, but the role of the external sanctioning process
is plainly subordinate to the sphere of private choice.
The primacy accorded to the private side of contracts was grounded
upon an assumption of equal bargaining power which has become increasingly difficult to sustain. The awareness of disproportionate power
in the warranty area has begun to permeate the entire field of contracts.
A growing social consciousness that commercial agreements are part of
an exploitive process in which financial power often dictates contract
terms has begun to shift attention to the public, "external" side of
agreements. Thus the Uniform Commercial Code empowers courts to
refuse to enforce agreements which are found to be "unconscionable.""
An improved understanding of the oppressive realities of economic
life has generated a response from that part of law which is concerned
with the processes of exchange and consumption. But the detrimental
effects of industrial capitalism upon human values is not restricted to
the realm of contracts. Concentrations of economic power and the inevitable subordination of human values to private profit have spread
through our entire social life. Business considerations are intruded into
spheres of existence in which they are out of place. This is especially the
case with respect to communications.
In our society, the mass media are a means of private gain; acquisition of publishing facilities and radio and television licenses are matters
of high finance. As a result, the humanistic purposes of communication
are obscured. Where circulation is the decisive criteria for the publication of books and newspapers, genuine enlightenment is lost in sales statistics. Provocative ideas are not of immediate interest since instant
satisfaction is the criterion of sales. Ostensibly, the same holds true for
radio and television where entertainment is a product delivered to
advertisers. Its content is aimed at reaching the widest possible audience,
an orientation which inevitably cultivates the baser levels of human
existence.
Ironically, these extensions of free enterprise into the realms of
communication and culture lead to an unfree society. When the realms
of thought and art are invaded by commerce, the real, objective interests
of individuals are replaced by immediate, subjective satisfactions. Violent information is substituted for considered reporting, sensual entertainment replaces ennobling drama, and a bombardment of advertise11 UNIFORm Co mIVRCIALCODE § 2-502. There has been extensive commentary upon
the unconscionability concept. See, e.g., Ellinghaus, In Defense of Unconscionability, 78
YALE L.J. 757 (1969); Leff, Unconscionability and the Code -The
Emperor's New Clause,
115 U. PA. L. REv. 485 (1967).
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ment obliterates the public discussion of vital questions. Subordinated
to conditions of production and exchange, the communications media
fail to create those conditions by which men can pursue truth, goodness
and beauty. 12
Here, as within the agreement process, law has begun to transform
the existing situation into the possibility for a humanistic civilization.
Within the prosaic phenomena of standing one can discern a jural development which can significantly affect the influence of business in
communications. In Office of Communication of the United Church of
Christ v. FCC 13 the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) had

under consideration the renewal of a license to operate a television station. A church communication office and its members, seeking to present
evidence against the renewal, filed a petition to intervene. They wished
to show that the station was guilty of racial and religious bias and also
broadcast an excessive number of advertisements. The FCC denied the
petition on the ground, inter alia, that petitioners could not prove the
existence of a legally protected interest which would entitle them to
intervene. However, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit reversed. Speaking for the court, Judge Burger said:
The Commission's rigid adherence to a requirement of direct economic injury in the commercial sense operates to give standing to
an electronics manufacturer who competes with the owner of a radio-television station... while it denies standing to spokesmen for
the listeners, who are most directly concerned with and intimately
affected by the performance of a licensee. Since the concept of
standing is a practical and functional one designed to insure that
only those with a genuine and legitimate interest can participate
in a proceeding, we can see no reason to exclude those with such
an obvious and acute concern as the listening audience. This much
seems essential to insure that the holders of broadcasting licenses
be responsive to the needs of the audience, without which the
broadcaster could not exist.
12 A dominant theme in Marcuse's thought is that the technological power of advanced
industrial societies is totalitarian. Production and consumption (of services as well as
goods) is its life-blood; modem technology must stimulate private wants as well as establish social functions. As a result it tends to abolish, or at least substantially obscure, traditional distinctions between public and private existence. Because the importance of
wealth must be constantly stressed, commercial modalities are intruded into spheres of
existence where they are incongruous. This is especially true of the media because it is
an area of existence which, by its nature, engages the spiritual aspects of life. Oral and
visual communication calls forth aspirations towards moral values, knowledge and aesthetic contemplation; when the structures are subordinated to commercial considerations
the damage to the human spirit is incalculable.
13 359 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
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[U]nless the listeners -

the broadcast consumers -

can be heard,

there may be no one to bring programming deficiencies or offensive
overcommercialization to the attention of the commission in an effective manner. By process of elimination those "consumers" willing to shoulder the burdensome and costly processes of intervention in a Commission proceeding are likely to be the only ones
"having a sufficient interest" to challenge a renewal application.
The late Edmond Cahn addressed himself to this problem in its
broadest aspects when he said, "Some consumers need bread; others
need Shakespeare; others need their rightful place in the national
society - what they all need is processes of law who will consider
the people's needs more significant than administrative convenience."14

The prevailing ethos is one which equates material abundance with
human fulfillment. This assumption -shared by middle, as well as
upper class sectors of society - has been challenged by a social criticism
which contrasts the propaganda of mass prosperity with insights into a
collective sadness and bewilderment. The affluence offered by modem
finance and technology is not enough because it diminishes the humanity of those fortunate enough to enjoy its advantages. But the New Left
also finds industrial capitalism wanting since it excludes persons from
obtaining the goods which it generates.
Existing institutions may frustrate the more sublime aspirations of
man, but they have also provided many with a high standard of living.
This is a way of life with which most lawyers can identify, but beyond
lies the "other America."
The other America is not impoverished in the same sense as
those poor nations where millions cling to hunger as a defense
against starvation. This country has escaped such extremes. That
does not change the fact that tens of millions of Americans are,
at this very moment, maimed in body and spirit, existing at levels
beneath those necessary for human decency. If these people are
not starving, they are hungry, and sometimes fat with hunger, for
that is what cheap foods do. They are without adequate housing
and education and medical care.
The Government has documented what this means to the
bodies of the poor.... But even more basic, this poverty twists
and deforms the spirit. The American poor are pessimistic and
defeated, and they are victimized by mental suffering to a degree
unknown in Suburbia.'s
Law and legal institutions have begun to respond to the realities
14 Id. at 1002, 1004-05, citing Cahn, Law in the Consumer Perspective, 112 U. PA.
L. Rrv. 1. 13 (1963).
15 M. HARMNGTON, THE OTHER AM ICA 9 (1964).
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of poverty. In its response to the needs of the consumer, the jural reaction has involved a reconsideration of traditional concepts. Broadening
the meaning of property to include the basic needs of survival as well
as the protection of wealth,:6 dusting off forgotten concepts such as
rights of travel to aid those in need of welfare, 17 or assuring adequate
rights for poor, as well as rich, individuals accused of crime, are some of
the ways by which the legal process reveals its awareness of the pervasiveness of poverty.'
Yet while all these changes are important they do not carry with
them the capacity to bring about a substantial or comprehensive change
in existing conditions. Neither in its response to the needs of the affluent
whose true humanity has been obscured by economic power, nor its
solicitude for the poor, has legal theory or practice developed the instruments necessary for a total response to the challenge of social criticism.
The lines of jural development sketched herein are important, and are
reflective of that case-by-case inductive technique which is our primary
form of lawmaking. Yet, in and of themselves, they lack the potential of
saving the alienation of modern man, of overcoming the extreme separation of personal and social existence which is the pervasive malaise
ofpour time.
Manifestly if law is to be in the vanguard of change, it cannot
limit its horizons to a piecemeal reshaping of traditional doctrines and
,concepts. Such a modality is essential, but it does not exhaust the potential of legal thought and action. A momentous evolution has already
begun to transform the conditions of existence; to be "relevant" legal
education and professional practice must be substantially reoriented
toward the dynamics of human fulfillment which are stirring beneath
a veneer of social tranquility.
NiEw DIRECTIONS

In the preceding discussion some of the ways in which the law has
reacted to the stimulus of social criticism have been traced. Most of
these changes have been carried out within the existing legal doctrines:
extending traditional concepts into newer areas of need or making more
viable the procedures by which the deeper human issues can be adju16 Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964).
17 Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
18 See, e.g., Griffin v. Illinois 351 U.S. 12 (1956). There are other significant developments in other aspects of poverty law. E.g., Canigiana v. Deptula, 59 Misc. 2d 401, 299
N.Y.S.2d 234 (D.C. Nassau County 1969) (stay of ejectment in case involving welfare dient). For some avant garde reflections see Horowitz & Neitring, Equal Protection Aspects
of Inequalities in Public Education and Public Assistance Programs from Place to Place
Within a State, 15 U.C.LA.L R v. 787 (1968).
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dicated. A great deal of the continuing effort will be along similar lines;
this is all to the good. Yet much more will be required if existing social,
economic and political institutions are to be transformed so as to serve
deeper human aspirations. To develop an agenda for the future we
should understand how the New Left views the present.
In its extreme form, the new movement is apolitical. Refusal of
existing institutions is its modus operandi, a rejection not only of the
status quo but also of the procedures for change which are part of the
established order. From a radical perspective, established institutions
of democracy are so removed from authentic needs as to be virtually irredeemable.
The "unorthodox" character of this opposition, which does
not have the traditional class basis, and which is at the same time
a political, instinctual, and moral rebellion, shapes the strategy
and scope of the rebellion. It extends to the entire organization
of the existing liberal-parliamentary democracy. Among the New
Left, a strong revulsion against traditional politics prevails: against
that whole network of parties, committees, and pressure groups
on all levels; against working within this network and with its
methods.... [F]or them, this is not a question of choice; the pro-

test and refusal are parts of their metabolism, and they extend to
the power structure as a whole. The democratic process organized
by this structure is discredited to such an extent that no part of it
can be extracted which is not contaminated. Moreover, using this
process would divert energy to snail-paced movements.... And the
performance of the courts, from the lowest to the highest, does not
mitigate the distrust in the given democratic-constitutional setup.
Under these circumstances, to work for the improvement of the
existing democracy easily appears as indefinitely delaying attainment of the goal of creating a free society1 9
In its more moderate forms, the New Left hopes for improvement
through changes in political organization. For example, Michael Harrington looks hopefully toward a political alliance of the poor, the
working classes and professional elites who are committed to the public
sector.20 Such a union is viewed as a primary means of alleviating the
problems of this "accidental century." What then of the legal profession, juridical institutions, the practice of law? If the needs of human
freedom became keenly felt, if the emancipation of man from his subservience to industrial capitalism became a jural imperative, what
would be the future direction of law and legal theory? And if the re19 LiBERATION

62-63.

20 M. HAPMNGTON, ToWARDS A DioC=Tic LEr ch. 10 (1968).
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newal of settled principles is inadequate, what new directions are
possible?
No one can accurately predict the course of legal evolution, but
some tentative observations can be made. The future will be formed by
legal educators, students and practitioners who fully comprehend the
nature of the human crisis. This is the indispensable personal dimension; reform must be guided by men who perceive and seek the good,
those who make human improvement rather than private gain the
paramount motive of their action.
Beyond this, there must be a substantial rethinking of legal theory
and practice. Traditional legal method is heavily oriented toward an
individualistic view of existence. It focuses upon the direct, immediate
needs of human beings: the redress of particular harms, the protection
of specific persons from the oppressive power of government, the distinct
legal needs of separate segments of the community. Without qualification, this is, and shall always be, a desirable commitment. But it must
be conceded that this emphasis misses some of the broader issues of
social policy. The attitude of law towards concentrations of economic
power illustrates the limitations.
Antitrust laws have individualistic objectives. It is considered desirable to break up large business units if they threaten a free enterprise
model of relatively small participants operating within nineteenth-century conceptions of an open market. As legal policies designed to insure
free competition, they testify to our belief in the worth of individuals
whose initiative and creativity would otherwise be crushed by the ruthless power of large corporations. Insistence upon competitive conditions
also pays public dividends in terms of product diversity and more realistic price structures. But as corporate organizations become more complex, existing legal policy seems to be an inadequate instrument for the
21
control of increasing economic power.
21 Conglomerate mergers are illustrative. See the discussion by Mr. Justice Harlan in
FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 581-604 (1966) (concurring opinion), and
Davidow, Conglomerate Concentration and Section Seven: The Limitations of the AntiMerger Act, 68 CoLuMr. L. REv. 1231 (1968); but see Turner, The Scope of Antitrust and
Other Economic Regulatory Policies, 82 HARv. L. REv. 1207 (1969). Legal theory in this
area seems to be lacking an adequate understanding of how modern technology inevitably
leads to a concentration of resources. Such mergers may result in substantial impairment
of competition, but it is difficult to identify such effects within settled definitions of illegal advantage. Moreover there is some desire for a "balancing" test, i.e., weighing possible
adverse effects against the economies which can result from conglomerates. The real difficulty lies with the remedy. Noncompetitive mergers can be rationally justified, but they
involve dangers to the public welfare because of their concentrations of power. What will
be needed is a form of governmental regulation, probably some type of agency supervision. For the general potentials of this approach, see the textual discussion accompanying

notes 25-38 infra.
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The same is true of prevailing private lawmaking approaches to
business organization and development. The good that flows from this
form of law practice has already been considered. What is not sufficiently
appreciated, however, is the fact that private business decisions have
inevitable social consequences. The private practitioner with a corporate clientele may properly take satisfaction when he creates the legal
instruments designed to facilitate the acquisitive growth of companies;
but he should also realize that he is thereby involved in activity which
may have a profound effect upon the community as a whole. For example, a single corporate merger can significantly affect wages and
prices in the immediate, as well as in related, industries. Indeed, broad
implications emanate from nearly all particular business decisions. The
private planning of the suburban developer leads to enormous social
costs in terms of taxes, transportation, education, and race relations.
And these are consequences over which "the law" has little or no
22
control.
To better harmonize legal practice with the social dimensions of
life, we should reexamine the modem definition of law. Previously,
recent developments in legal theory were traced, especially the shift
away from Austinian definitions. 23 Rather than conceiving of law as a
purely external, sanctioning process, the new theory incorporates internal perspectives into legal definition. The way in which individuals
and officials view "the law" is as important as any abstract model of a
legal system. Thus, contemporary jurisprudence defines law as a union
of primary rules of obligation with secondary rules of recognition,
change and adjudication.
We noted earlier that rules of change are important because they
relate to a lawyer's predominant professional activities of drafting documents needed by individuals to acquire property, exchange goods and
services, etc. But it should be remembered that the rules of change are
twofold. The idea that law consists of these rules includes the notion of
public as well as private powers. To overcome the static quality of rules,
a dynamic society confers authority upon public officials to modify and
change existing precepts as well as authorizing private modalities of
development.
Defining law to include public powers of change overcomes the
difficulties which legislative activity raised for traditional theory. The
22 This is a major theme of Harrington. He cogently demonstrated (in THE ACCIDENTAL CENTuRy (1967)) how modem business decisions are necessarily social in their effects,
and that a good deal of our present difficulties flow from a general inability to comprehend this process.
23 See text accompanying notes 1-7 supra.

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 45:$9

decision of Congress to enact a statute could not be rationalized as an
act of obedience to a sovereign power threatening a sanction in case of
noncompliance. It can be understood as the exercise of a power conferred upon legislators by society so that law can be adapted to the
evolving needs of the nation.
Legislation is a manifestation of public rules of change, the importance of which is bound to increase in the future. But it is the administrative agency which possesses the greatest operative power to transform
the present subordination of man into a realm of freedom. At both the
federal and state levels the discretionary judgment of agency officials
shall, for good or ill, determine the extent to which the vast resources
of technology and finance created by industrial capitalism will be used
to promote the objective, real interests of the human person.
The issuance of a license by the Federal Power Commission or the
Secretary of Interior can determine whether our natural resources shall
be exploited for private gain or preserved for aesthetic contemplation.
The level of expertise within a state regulatory commission affects the
relative power of public utilities. And the war on poverty is, and will
continue to be, a war fought with administrative weapons: increased
food subsidies, better housing and medical care, quality education regardless of race or class - these are aspirations which, in large measure,
must be satisfied by bureaucratic officials and personnel if they are to
be satisfied at all. 24
The attitude taken toward a growth in administrative authority by
the legal profession will be an important part of this overall development. It is well to remember that the prevailing feeling of the legal profession for the administrative process is basically negative. Both common-law and constitutional traditions require the lawyer to view the
administrator with a jaundiced eye.
The exercise of administrative discretion includes the possibility
of arbitrary power, and legal theory approaches the administrative
process with that possibility in mind. The lawyer tends to think of
the process from the viewpoint of controlling it. He reacts to its reality;
24

Harrington argues that the processes by which public decisions are made should
be more democratic. He is especially critical of the tendency of federal programs to be
the servant of priorities established in the private sector or as being responsive to the
needs of a limited part of the society-e.g., the financing of suburban housing. He would
establish agencies for democratic planning to assure that major decisions are made in
terms of genuine social need. M. HARRINGTON, ToWARMS A DEMOCRATIC LEFT ch. 2 (1968).
Legal theory can assist this process especially to the degree that the reforms hope to make
political forums more representative. The stress upon the administrative process in the
present essay complements the approach taken by Harrington, for however democratic
one would make the basic policy decisions, there remains the task of implementation
which is the normal function of administrative agencies.
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for every aspect of its activity he has a protective response. To administrative jurisdiction he interposes rights to counsel and common-law
standards of proof; to agency decision he replies with the power of
judicial review.
Although antagonism between "law" and the administrative process is inevitable, some tension assures the protection of individuals
from arbitrary power.25 However, there is a growing awareness that
deference to administrative judgment can be productive of public good.
Legal scholars have written of the importance of permitting administrative discretion to function unless the judiciary is convinced that
statutory purposes are being contradicted; 26 judges are also becoming
conscious of the dangers of pre-enforcement challenges to administrative regulation. 27 More importantly, courts are beginning to use their
power of judicial review in a constructive, positive manner which has
immense value for the future of legal process and the development of
civilization.
The use of our national resources can, of course, materially affect
the quality of our civilization. Decisions concerning their use can
either continue the exploitation of the material aspects of existence or
they can reassert the spiritual dimensions of life. Our society has invested an enormous amount of discretion in agency officials to make
these choices. Administrators possess a public authority to make rules
25 For a reminder of this continuing tension see Berger, Administrative Arbitrariness,
A Synthesis, 78 YALE L.J. 936 (1969).
26 L. JAFFE, JuDiciAL CONTROL OF ADMINIsrRATIVE ACTION 573 (1965).

27 In Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 887 U.S. 136 (1966), the Supreme Court sustained a pre-enforcement challenge to regulations promulgated by the Commissioner of
Food and Drugs. Dissenting, Justice Fortas wrote:
With all respect, I submit that established principles of jurisprudence, solidly rooted in the constitutional structure of our Government, require that the
courts should not intervene in the administrative process at this stage, under
these facts and in this gross, shotgun fashion.... In none of these cases is judicial interference warranted at this stage, in this fashion, and to test -on a gross,
free-wheeling basis- whether the content of these regulations is within the statutory intendment. The contrary is dictated by a proper regard for the purpose
of the regulatory statute and the requirements of effective administration; and
by regard for the salutary rule that courts should pass upon concrete, specific
questions in a particularized setting rather than upon a general controversy divorced from particular facts.
The Court, by today's decisions . . . has opened Pandora's box. Federal injunctions will now threaten programs of vast importance to the public welfare.
The Court's holding here strikes at programs for the public health. The dangerous precedent goes even further. It is cold comfort- it is little more than delusion- to read in the Court's opinion that "It is scarcely to be doubted that a
court would refuse to postpone the effective date of an agency action if the Government could show . . . that delay would be detrimental to the public health
or safety." Experience dictates, on the contrary, that it can hardly be hoped that
some federal judge somewhere will not be moved as the Court is here, by the
cries of anguish and distress of those regulated, to grant a disruptive injunction.
ld. at 175-76.
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of change in the deepest sense of that jurisprudential expression.
There are some encouraging indications that judges are beginning to
use their public power of review so as to ensure that administrative
decisions are in accord with the real interests of society.
Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC28 is illustrative
of this trend. Consolidated Edison sought a license from the Federal
Power Commission for a proposed hydro-electric plant on the Hudson
River-the so-called "Storm King" project. Conservation groups and
affected municipalities opposed the application. When the FPC granted
the license, the opponents petitioned the Second Circuit Court of Appeals to set aside the license. The court held that these groups had
standing to sue, and interpreted the statutory standards for granting licenses to mean that the agency had the duty to take historical and
aesthetical considerations into account in making their decisions. The
court, reasoning that the Commission had erroneously rejected evidence
of alternative power sources, decided that the agency was accountable
for the full exercise of its authority:
In this case, as in many others, the Commission has claimed
to be the representative of the public interest. This role does not
permit it to act as an umpire blandly calling balls and strikes for
adversaries appearing before it; the right of the public must receive
active and affirmative protection at the hands of the Commission.
This court cannot and should not attempt to substitute its
judgment for that of the Commission. But we must decide whether
the Commission has correctly discharged its duties, including the
proper fulfillment of its planning function in deciding that the
"licensing of the project would be in the overall public interest."
The Commission must see to it that the record is complete. The
Commission has an affirmative duty to inquire into and consider
all relevant facts. 20
In taking this approach, the court exercised its authority, i.e.,
public power of adjudication,"0 to ensure that those authorized to direct
the growth of our civilization, i.e., public powers of change exercise
their commission in a way consonant with the public good. There are
important ramifications of this technique, especially as we become
aware of the vitality of the administrative agency in the long-range
28 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965).

20 Id. at 620.
80 With respect to the judicial process, it is not possible to explain the judicial process solely in terms of rules of adjudication. Courts not only determine a breach of law,
they also create it; judges exercise a public power of change as well as adjudication strictly
so-called. Indeed the expression "rules of recognition" can also be applied to courts since
they do exercise a validating function, especially in the area of constitutional law. For a
more thorough discussion of these terms, see text accompanying notes 1-7 supra.
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uggle to transform the chaos of our "accidental century" into a humistic age. The impotency of government before the social conseLences of private power can only be overcome when administrative
thority measures up to its potential; lawyers and judges have a crucial
le to play in this evolving process.
Another example of this changing attitude of the law toward adiistrative action can be drawn from the field of insurance regulation.
he insurance industry is under the jurisdiction of state regulatory
)dies, agencies which are often poorly staffed and unequal to the
lancial and legal expertise which the industry can muster. This is
pecially true of rate schedules whereby the insurance interests demand
te increases, contending that higher premiums are required to insure
eir solvency and a reasonable profit. The accounting utilized is often
cepted by the agency with very little probing and depth analysis. Conquently, companies often earn excess profits from reserve funds which
.ey are able to exclude from the rating calculations. Viewed in its
tality this is an important example of considerations of private utility
tablishing the norms of social policy. Recently, however, the Virginia
ipreme Court invoked the power of judicial review to compel the
sponsible exercise of administrative authority, thus narrowing the gap
.tween laissez faire economics and the public good.
In Virginia State AFL-CIO v. Commonwealth3l the National Buau of Casualty Underwriters filed, on behalf of over a hundred commies, an application for an increase in automobile liability insurance
tes. The State Corporation Commission held public hearings, rejectig a 9.9 percent increase sought by the Bureau, but granting an in-ease of 8.2 percent. In fixing the rate, the Commission considered
tcome derived from investment of unearned premium reserves but
-fused to consider income derived from investment of the loss reserve.
'he Commission reasoned that since the loss reserve constitutes assets
ntributed by the company stockholders, the policyholders were no
tore entitled to share in the earnings from that reserve than they would
e vis-h-vis investment earnings from original capital.
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Virginia held that under the
atutory mandate to consider "all relevant factors" the Commission
ras required to consider investment income. With respect to income
-om investment on loss reserves, the court, concluding that the Comiission had confused "earned premiums with earnings," reversed:
We . . . hold that the Commission should consider income
81209 Va. 776; 167 S.E.2d 322 (1969).
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from investment of the loss reserve, as well as from investment
of the unearned premium reserve, as a "relevant factor" in fixing
a "reasonable margin for underwriting profit and contingencies."
On remand of this case, the Commission should admit evidence
respecting such investment income and, in the light of such evidence and of the evidence relating to the other factors to be considered by the Commission, authorize rates that will provide a
reasonable margin for underwriting profit and contingencies.3 2
One further area where the perspectives of judicial process and
administrative law will interact is the realm of communications. Freedom of thought and expression is the sine qua non of a democratic
society; absent the free exchange of ideas the people cannot make intelligent choices about their social or personal destinies. But, as we have
already observed, the channels of communication are dogged with
commercialism. As a result, the humanistic objectivities of enlightenment are subordinated to the demands of profit maximization. Every
aspect of the mass media suffers this servitude and unless it is alleviated
the ideals of a free society, one in which the deeper needs of the spirit
can flourish, and where real, rather than immediate interests are served,
will never be realized.
We have already indicated some of the responses which the legal
order has made to this crisis in communicative freedom. Granting standing to persons interested in the public norms relevant to the licensing
of the airways is a case in point and developments along this line are
continuing. 3 New directions are also emerging, particularly with
respect to the right of access to channels of communication.3 4 But if we
look to the administrative process for creative developments, the results
are generally disappointing.
32 209 Va. at 786-87; 167 SXE.2d 327-28 (1969). For a general discussion of these issues
see Friedman, Why Automobile Insurance Rates Keep Going up, ATLANTic, Sept. 1969,

at 58.
There is an emerging form of judicial review in the constitutional area which may
parallel the developments vis-A-vis the administrative agency. Some commentators see the
decision of the Supreme Court in Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967), as the beginning of a movement by which the courts will require states to take positive steps to alleviate injustice. See Karst & Horowitz, Reitman v. Mulkey: A Telophase of Substantive
Equal Protection, 1967 Sup. Or. REv. 39. Cf. Michaelman, Foreword: On Protecting the
Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARV. L. REv. 7 (1969). The extent to which
jural energies should be devoted towards that reform route depends upon an assessment
of all avenues of change, e.g., the administrative process as well as other modes of "state"
action.
33 E.g., Licensing diversification. See Comment, The Federal Communications Commission and ComparativeBroadcast Hearings: WHDH as a Case Study in Changing Standards, 10 B.C. IND. & Com. L. REv. 943 (1969). The problems of economic concentrations
are analyzed in Commissioner Johnson's article, The Media Barons and the Public Interest, AT.mATc, June 1968, at 43.
34 See Red Lion Broadcasting Co., Inc. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969); Barron, Emerging
First Amendment Right to Access to Media?, 37 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 487 (1967).
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There are very good reasons why our society has been reluctant to
increase bureaucratic supervision of the radio and television industries.
Normal fear of governmental power is compounded by the dangers of
censorship - an apprehension intensified by the recent policy addresses
of the Vice President. We should not allow, however, a well-grounded
concern to become a social paralysis. The dangers to freedom generated
by governmental intervention should not obscure the fact that without
meaningful administrative regulation the utilization of the media for
the purposes of general freedom, rather than private profit, is simply
unattainable. 35
The improvement of the mass media depends directly upon the
personal initiative and responsibility of those involved in the communicative process. What the media will become depends primarily upon
what they desire to make of it. But where the form of communication
directly involves the public interest -as in the use of the airways governmental response must be adequate to the public trust. This does
not necessitate censorship; the genius of the administrative process is
such that adequate regulative instruments can be shaped which
will promote the public interest without impairing first amendment
freedoms.
For instance, the licensing power of the FCC should encompass the
networks as well as individual stations. Since local channels rely heavily
upon the networks for programming, efforts to control the major vices
of the existing system are abortive because they do not reach the source
of the problem. Moreover, the fundamental reason for the present system's working against human freedom is that decisions concerning the
quality of programming are made in terms of a profit motive. In the
main, the type of "entertainment" is not chosen in terms of its potential
to elevate the humanistic qualities of the audience, programs are "packages" which are sold to advertisers in terms of their market potential.
And. as a condition of receiving the program, audiences are subjected
to the constant interruption of inane advertisements. As long as this
is the normal mode of operation, we have no hope of receiving from the
media that quality of enlightenment which is indispensable to a civilized existence.
The public powers of change which we assert as the model of a
new jurisprudence can be exercised to improve this situation without
impairing basic freedoms. If licensing power were extended to cover
85 Most civilized countries have some measure of governmental involvement in, or
regulation of, radio and television. For a review of the European experience, see F.
Doamt,

CoMmrrmENT To CuLTuRE (1964).
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networks, the emerging notions of the public interest could be applied
more meaningfully to the industry as a whole. Prior experimentations
with balanced programming standards could be improved. By demanding that licensees devote a certain percentage of the broadcast day to
programs of education and public affairs, government could exert a
positive influence for the improvement of quality without directly interfering with the actual content of the programs. Additionally, it should
be possible to develop reasonable regulations with respect to the frequency of advertisements, although the Congress has hitherto refused
to grant such a power to the FCC.36
CONCLUSION

For many, life in our industrial society is a smooth comfortable
existence. Corporate capitalism and technology have made possible a
way of life which would have seemed utopian to our ancestors; however, the advance has been expensive. We are beginning to understand
the real costs of affluence: high standards of living are maintained by
a transformation of being into buying; the spiritual autonomy and
aspirations of man are reduced to commodity proportions; and this
one-dimensional community denies its forgotten poor a minimal level
of decency.
Contemporary critics

-

the New Left of social criticism

-

have

added immeasurably to our understanding of how the established system represses the deeper aspirations of the human person toward autonomy and independence. And in so doing they have not only exposed the
weaknesses of the prevailing economy, but have also called to account
those who help perpetuate the servitudes. Thus, a theory of social criticism stands over against law, challenging its autonomy, calling upon it
to rethink its purposes and direction.
In large measure, the rethinking is occurring. In areas as diverse
as warranties and standing to sue, we have seen how scholars, practitioners and judges are exploiting the potential of established concepts,
extending them to reassert the primacy of justice over materialism. And
in the fight to bring dignity to the poor, the viability of traditional
norms and techniques is evident. But if legal practice and theory is to
86 See Blalock, Television and Advertising, 28 FED. Com. B. J. 341 (1968). Earlier efforts
by the FCC to require balanced programming were ineffective because stations could devote
periods of low audience participation for public affairs programming while reserving
"prime" time for commercial purposes. The efforts to meet the problem through the establishment of Public Broadcasting Corporation (47 U.S.C. § 396 et seq. (1966)), while done
for noble motives, in reality evades the issue of governmental' responsibility for the abuse
of the airways by the major networks.
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be in the vanguard of change, it must enlarge as well as deepen its perspectives. Legal theory and practice must become multi-dimensional,
conscious of all of the ways that law can be allied with human progress.
New perspectives are needed because private lawmaking has adverse social consequences. The directive force of business has an aura
of private initiative, but single choices affect the whole balance of
society. Similarly, our concerns have been too singular; legal practice
has absorbed the "Adam Smithian" myth that an "invisible hand"
moves private choices toward a public good. We must become more
responsive to the actual impact of particular decisions upon the entire
community if our professional commitments are to be truly in the
public interest.
Lawyers can measure up to social criticism by giving as much attention to public powers as they have given to private lawmaking. Much
of the future lies in a creative union of administrative and judicial
authority. Federal and state agencies will make the basic humanistic
decisions and these choices will be guided by a positive form of judicial
review. Through the cooperative exercise of these public powers of
change, lawyers, judges and administrators can shape a new civilization.
By cultivating these public capacities we can hope to overcome the
dichotomy between personal and social existence and make modern
society responsive to the real, objective needs of the human person.

